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Abstract 
We review the role of the central bank’s balance sheet in a textbook 
monetary model and explore what changes if the central bank is allowed to 
pay interest on its liabilities. When the central bank (CB) cannot pay interest, 
away from the zero lower bound its (real) balance sheet is limited by the 
demand for money. Furthermore, if securities are not marked to market and 
the central bank holds its bonds to maturity, it is impossible for the CB to 
make losses, and it always obtains profits from being a monopoly provider 
of money. When the option of paying interest on liabilities is allowed, the 
limit on the CB’s balance sheet is lifted. In this case, the CB is free to take 
on interest-rate risk – for example, by buying long-term securities and 
financing those purchases with short-term debt that pays the market interest 
rate. This is a risky enterprise that can lead to additional profits but also to 
losses. To the extent that losses exceed the profits of the monopoly 
operations, the CB faces two options: either it is recapitalised by Treasury or 
it increases its monopoly profits by raising the inflation tax. 
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Policy points 
• When money supply is constantly increasing to accommodate growth 
and/or inflation, the portfolio of assets owned by a central bank is not 
needed to back the value of its liabilities. 
• The ability to pay interest on bank reserves allows a central bank to 
leverage its assets and dramatically increases its capacity to take fiscal 
risk, which ultimately spills over to the budget constraint of the fiscal 
authorities. 
• When fiscal and monetary authorities have independent objectives, the 
fiscal consequences of the central bank’s asset-management choices may 
generate conflict and call into question its independence. 
• The Federal Reserve policy of quantitative easing currently undoes at 
least a third of the hedge against interest-rate movements stemming from 
issuance of long-term debt by Treasury. 
I. Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath have brought about dramatic 
changes in the balance sheet of the central banks (CBs) of the largest 
economies in the world. Faced with the inability to wield their traditional 
policy instrument, which effectively hit the zero lower bound on short-term 
rates, CBs greatly expanded their balance sheet. While these purchases 
entailed a variety of assets in the immediate aftermath of 2008, they have 
since concentrated on bonds (particularly long-term) issued or guaranteed by 
the governments of their economies; as an example, Figures 1 and 2 show 
the case of the Federal Reserve in the United States. This expansion was 
financed in large part by deposits, as shown in Figure 3.1 At the beginning of 
the crisis, in September 2008, while the Fed funds rate was still well above 
zero and the Fed was not yet allowed to pay interest on reserves, these 
deposits were held by the US Treasury; but since then they have been largely 
deposits of commercial banks. Not since the Great Depression has the 
balance of deposits of commercial banks been so large compared with their 
minimum required reserves. With slight differences in timing, a very similar 
picture arises in the case of the European Central Bank and the Bank of 
England (see Figures A1 and A2 in the online appendix2). 
Just as it took years for the expansion in the CBs’ assets to take place, it 
is likely that years will also pass before their balance sheet returns to 
resemble its pre-2008 composition, with liabilities dominated by currency 
1For definitions, see the online appendix (http://www.ifs.org.uk/docs/fsdec13_bassetto&messer_ 
appendix.pdf). 
2http://www.ifs.org.uk/docs/fsdec13_bassetto&messer_appendix.pdf. 
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notes.3 During this transition, excess reserves deposited by commercial 
banks will have to be paid the market short-term rate. If the transition is not 
complete by the time CBs desire to lift short-term rates from zero to contain 
inflationary pressures, paying interest on reserves will thus be necessary. 
Our goal is not to assess the role that large-scale asset purchases played in 
the pursuit of monetary policy objectives; indeed, our analysis is based on a 
simplified model where no such role is present. Our goal is to review instead 
the fiscal implications of such purchases. The starting point of our analysis is 
Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) insight that monetary and fiscal authorities are 
eventually forced to coordinate because they face a single, consolidated 
budget constraint, to which seigniorage revenues contribute.4 We go beyond 
Sargent and Wallace by unbundling the budget constraints of the 
government and the CB. In a world in which the latter is simply an agency 
under direct control of the executive, there is no reason to distinguish  
 
FIGURE 1 
Federal Reserve assets by major category since 2007 
 
3Bank excess reserves remained elevated into the 1940s in the aftermath of the Great Depression. 
4The role of nominal debt in this connection has been explored more recently by Leeper (1991), Sims 
(1994), Woodford (1994), Bassetto (2002 and 2008) and Cochrane (2005), among others. Sims (2005 and 
2013) has discussed in greater detail how the balance sheet of the CB affects its ability to achieve price-
level determinacy. 
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FIGURE 2 
Maturity structure of Federal Reserve assets since 2007 
 
 
Note: This graph only includes liquidity and credit facilities, securities held outright, TALF (Term Asset-
Backed Securities Loan Facility), repurchase agreements and central bank liquidity swaps, for which 
maturity data are readily available. 
 
between CB and Treasury liabilities. But things change when monetary 
policy is conducted by an ‘independent’ CB, formally tasked with 
objectives, such as price and macroeconomic stability, that may conflict with 
the desires of fiscal authorities. In this case, it is conceivable that the 
magnitude of its profits and losses, as well as its transfers to fiscal 
authorities, may ultimately have an effect on the way fiscal–monetary 
coordination will occur. The CB may find it easier to concentrate on its 
mandate if it generates a steady stream of profits that can be transferred to 
Treasury. In contrast, it might find its independence under threat when it 
books losses, particularly in the extreme case in which these are so large as 
to require reverse transfers. 
To analyse the implications of different asset-management policies of the 
CB, we rely on a highly stylised, commonly-used model of a monetary 
economy.5 After displaying in Section II the linkages between the budget 
5Our model is based on Lucas and Stokey (1987). 
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constraints of Treasury and the central bank, confirming Sargent and 
Wallace (1981), we focus in Section III on the way different balance-sheet 
choices of the CB affect the riskiness of its position. Through a sequence of 
propositions, we show how increasingly aggressive portfolio-management 
strategies by the CB increase the risk of losses that would reduce (and, in 
extreme circumstances, erase or more than erase) the seigniorage transfers 
that can be paid to Treasury. 
We identify quantitative easing, defined as purchases of long-term bonds 
financed with the creation of excess reserves, as a qualitative break point in 
the fiscal risk implied by CB policy. To better understand this break point, 
an analogy with an individual investor is helpful. An individual investor 
buying bonds using its own assets may face losses on its portfolio, but may 
never lose more than the entire value of its initial capital. In contrast, an 
investor taking a leveraged position in bonds may lose more than its capital 
(although, of course, such a loss may be extremely unlikely if the leverage 
ratio is small). Compared with the portfolio of an individual investor, the 
balance sheet of a central bank is more complicated, in that it involves a 
significant amount of liabilities (currency) that pay no interest. Moreover,  
 
FIGURE 3 
Federal Reserve liabilities by major category since 2007 
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unlike the period of the gold standard, contemporary CBs do not back their 
currencies with assets, but rather money is irredeemable and takes value 
simply because of the liquidity services that it provides (money is ‘fiat’). For 
this reason, in computing the point at which a CB position becomes 
leveraged, liabilities in the form of currency (and required reserves) can be 
neglected. 
To complete our analysis, Section IV shows how the current positions of 
the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve System combine when assessing 
the overall exposure of fiscal authorities to interest-rate risk. Some simple 
computations show that the portfolio held by the monetary authorities 
reduces by more than a third the insurance against interest-rate movements 
that long-term debt offers to the taxpayers. This underscores the importance 
of an open debate on the division of debt-management tasks across the two 
agencies. 
Our paper is closely related to independent work by Hall and Reis (2013), 
who also identify excess reserves as a force driving the CB to potential 
losses and study the implications for the conduct of monetary policy; Hall 
and Reis show that quantitatively the Federal Reserve and the European 
Central Bank are unlikely to face losses that would threaten their ability to 
keep prices stable in the absence of a recapitalisation.6 In our work, we 
discuss the budget constraints of the fiscal, as well as the monetary, 
authorities and emphasise the similarity in the debt instruments managed by 
the central bank and Treasury. We are ultimately interested in the question of 
how the power to take fiscal risk is allocated across the two agencies, how 
coordination should be managed and what institutional rules could foster 
proper management. Answering this question requires an explicit theory of 
the objectives of fiscal and monetary authorities, and the way different asset-
management constraints affect their strategic interaction; we leave this step 
to future research. 
II. The set-up 
Our analysis is based on a very stylised model of an economy that  
features flexible prices and special assumptions about preferences, but the 
implications we discuss generalise to much richer environments, with more 
complex preferences and potentially many other frictions. We relegate the 
full description of the microfoundations of the model to the online appendix7 
and concentrate here on the essential elements. 
The economy features a continuum of private households and a 
government, separated into two agencies – ‘Treasury’ and the ‘central bank’ 
(CB). For each of these two agencies, we keep the model as simple as 
6Similar projections are also contained in Carpenter et al. (2013) and Greenlaw et al. (2013). 
7http://www.ifs.org.uk/docs/fsdec13_bassetto&messer_appendix.pdf. 
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possible by only including their functions and the budget items that are 
relevant for our discussion. 
Treasury issues government bonds of different maturities. We assume 
that there are just two maturities – one-period bonds, and consols, which 
promise a payment into the indefinite future. We denote by Bt the nominal 
amount of one-period bonds that are issued in period t and need to be repaid 
in period t+1 and by Dt the coupons due at the beginning of period t on all 
outstanding consols. Let Rt be the nominal interest rate between periods t and 
t+1 and Qt be the price of a consol in period t. To repay its debts, Treasury 
has the power to levy (lump-sum) taxes; let Tt be their nominal amount in 
period t. We abstract from government spending. 
The CB’s liabilities are ‘money’ and ‘excess reserves’. Money is 
interpreted here in the narrow sense of currency held by the private sector 
and required reserves. It has the unique feature of being monopolistically 
provided by the CB and it thus represents the source of CB profits. In 
contrast, excess reserves do not provide households any liquidity services 
beyond those that are also provided by short-term government debt; as a 
consequence, households will only hold them if they pay the same interest 
rate Rt as one-period debt. We let Mt be money that can be used in 
transactions in period t and Xt be the amount of excess reserves at the 
beginning of period t. On the asset side, the CB may hold government debt 
of either maturity.8 We assume that the CB cannot (or does not) sell 
government bonds short. Otherwise, the CB could circumvent a ban on 
paying interest on reserves simply by selling short-term Treasury bonds 
short. Treasury and the CB are linked by remittances (seigniorage), whose 
amount in period t is St. When St > 0, these represent distributions of profits 
from the CB to Treasury; this is the ordinary direction of transfers that we 
observe in the data. St < 0 indicates a recapitalisation of the CB by Treasury. 
The actions of Treasury and the CB are subject to their budget 
constraints. It is customary in macroeconomic models to lump the two 
constraints into one, since in practice Treasury is a residual claimant of the 
profits of the CB (through the seigniorage payments St) and, from a purely 
economic perspective, the distinction between the two agencies is 
superfluous. However, as we emphasised in the introduction, there are 
several reasons why the balance sheet of the CB may affect its independence 
and its ability and/or willingness to entertain alternative policy options. We 
thus consider the two as separate budget constraints. 
On a period-by-period basis, the budget constraint for Treasury is given 
by 
8We assume that the central bank only holds government debt. The analysis could readily be extended 
to the case in which the assets include privately-issued debt; in this case, in addition to interest-rate risk 
discussed in this paper, the central bank is also subject to credit risk. 
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(1) 1 1 1( ) .1
t
t t t t t t t
t
BB D Q D D S T
R− − −
+ = + − + +
+
 
At each period t, the left-hand side of equation (1) represents the Treasury’s 
repayment commitments – Bt–1 to the holders of short-term debt and a 
coupon Dt–1 to the holders of consols. The right-hand side represents the 
sources of funds – taxes from the private sector (Tt), seigniorage transfers 
from the central bank to Treasury (St), new issuance (or repurchase, if 
negative) of consols (Dt – Dt–1, valued at the consol price Qt) and new 
issuance of short-term debt (Bt, discounted at the current short-term nominal 
interest rate Rt). 
For the central bank, the budget constraint in period t is 
(2) 1 1 1 1 1( ) .1 1
B
B B B Bt t
t t t t t t t t t
t t
B XM M B Q D D D S X
R R− − − − −
− = − + − − + − +
+ +
 
Here, BtB  and 
B
tD  are central bank holdings of short-term and long-term 
Treasury debt respectively. Equation (2) shows all the possible sources of 
growth in the supply of money (as defined above). The central bank must 
increase the money supply if it decides to acquire more short-term debt than 
needed to roll over existing debt; similarly, it grows the money supply if it 
purchases new consols with value in excess of the coupon payment on 
existing holdings or if it increases its remittances to Treasury. Finally, the 
money supply increases if the central bank uses it to repay some of its own 
interest-bearing liabilities (excess reserves), rather than rolling them over. A 
contraction in the money supply can be achieved by any combination of 
these factors in reverse.  
The economy starts at time 0 with some initial stock of bonds, money and 
excess reserves, described by 1 1 1 1 1 1( , , , , , ).
B BB D B D M X− − − − − −  
From the terms in equation (2), it will be useful to identify the profits of 
the CB, which we define in two ways, depending on whether assets are 
carried at their historical cost or marked to market. In period t, profits at 
historical cost are given by 
(3) 
1
1
1 1 1 1 1
1
: ( ) ( )( )
1 B Bt t
HC B B B Bt
t t t t t t t t D D
t
R B X D Q Q D D I
R −
−
− − − − − >
−
Π = − + + − −
+
 
where 
1
B B
t tD D
I
− >
 is an indicator function that is 1 if 1
B B
t tD D− >  and 0 otherwise, 
and tQ  is the average historical cost of consols held by the central bank at 
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the end of period t–1.9 The first term of equation (3) represents net interest 
receipts on short-term debt instruments: the CB earns profits from its 
holdings of government debt, but makes losses when it pays interest on 
excess reserves. The second term represents the coupon payments on consols 
held at the beginning of the period. Finally, the last term, which is present 
only if the central bank sells long-term debt during the period, represents the 
realised capital gain (or loss, if negative) on the sale.  
The corresponding expression for profits when assets are marked to 
market is10 
(4) 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
: ( ) ( ) .
1
MM B B Bt
t t t t t t t
t
R B X D Q Q D
R
−
− − − − −
−
Π = − + + −
+
 
Compared to equation (3), the first two terms are identical, but now profits 
(or losses) are measured taking into account both realised and unrealised 
capital gains.  
The flow budget equations above will play an important role in our 
discussion of payments across different actors. Of independent interest are 
the present-value budget constraints, which can be computed by rolling 
equations (1) and (2) forward and imposing long-run balance:  
(5) 1 1(1 ) PV ( )t t t t s s
s t
B Q D S T
∞
− −
=
+ + = +∑  
and 
(6) 1 1 1 1(1 ) PV ( ) PV ( )
B B
t t t t t s s t s
s t s t
B Q D X M M S
∞ ∞
− − − −
= =
+ + − + − =∑ ∑  
where the function PVt represents the present value computed as of time t; 
details of the PV function are provided in the online appendix.11 
Equation (5) shows that the value of government debt at the beginning of 
period t is equal to the present value of future taxes and seigniorage transfers 
that will be used to repay it. 
In equation (6), the left-hand side represents the net value of the central 
bank at the beginning of period t. This is represented by two components. 
The first represents the value of holdings of government debt (which are 
assets for the CB), net of excess reserves. The second component, 
9Starting from some initial condition 1Q− , tQ  is defined recursively as 1t tQ Q −=  if 1
B B
t tD D −≤  and 
1 1 1( / ) (1 / )
B B B B
t t t t t t tQ D D Q D D Q− − −= + −  otherwise. 
10Since we assumed all of the CB liabilities to be short term, there is no issue of marking liabilities to 
market. 
11http://www.ifs.org.uk/docs/fsdec13_bassetto&messer_appendix.pdf. 
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represented by the infinite sum, stems from the monopoly privilege granted 
to the central bank to issue money, a liability that carries no interest but is 
still valued by the private sector for its liquidity services. This term captures 
the present value of monopoly profits that will accrue to the central bank 
from period t onwards. The net value of the CB matches the present value of 
seigniorage distributed to Treasury, the right-hand side of equation (6).12 
We complete the description of the economy by the following three 
equations, which characterise the behaviour of the private sector in each 
period t (a full description of the microfoundations of these equations 
appears in the online appendix13):  
(7) ( )t t
t
M L R
P
=  
(8) 1
1
1 E (1 )tt t t
t
P R
P
β +
+
 
= + 
 
 
(9) 1 1
1
1 1 E (1 )
1
t
t t t t t
t t
PQ R Q
R P
β + +
+
   = + +  +    
 
where L is a suitable function of the underlying household preferences, 
described by equation (A.3) in the online appendix, Et represents the 
expected value as of time t, Pt is the price level in period t and βt is an 
exogenous shock to the real interest rate,14 which is the only source of 
extrinsic uncertainty in the model.  
Equation (7) represents money demand and shows that real money 
balances (money divided by the price level) are a (decreasing) function of 
the opportunity cost of holding money, which is the nominal interest rate. 
Equation (8) is a Fisher equation that relates nominal interest rates and 
inflation: in high-inflation environments, households require higher nominal 
rates to willingly hold government debt (or central bank excess reserves).15 
Finally, equation (9) recursively links the price of a consol to current and 
future expected interest rates. In the absence of uncertainty, the equation 
would simplify to Qt = (1+Qt+1)/(1+Rt): the value of a consol in period t 
would be equal to the discounted value of its dividend in period t+1 (which 
12It is natural to think of this as dividend payments, treating Treasury as the true owner of the CB. 
Alternatively, it can be viewed as a tax on the CB. 
13http://www.ifs.org.uk/docs/fsdec13_bassetto&messer_appendix.pdf. 
14As commonly done in the literature (e.g. Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003), this is introduced as a 
preference shock. In practice, it is a short cut for a shock that affects financial intermediation and, through 
that channel, the desire of households to save and (in a richer model) to invest. 
15Equation (8) links inflation between periods t and t+1 to the nominal interest rate between periods 
t+1 and t+2. As discussed in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), this is a consequence of assuming the ‘cash-in-
advance’ timing. Our results would be equivalent under alternative timing assumptions in which Rt+1 is 
replaced by Rt. 
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is 1) and its price in period t+1 (Qt+1). In the presence of uncertainty, the 
more-complicated expression (9) takes into account the covariance between 
future interest rates and inflation, and it encompasses a risk premium that 
may make long-term rates higher than short-term rates on average. 
An additional condition, which we imposed directly, states that any 
excess reserves held by the public must yield the same return as short-term 
debt. Hence, if the short-term rate Rt is greater than zero and the CB is not 
allowed to pay interest on reserves, Xt will necessarily be zero. 
A (competitive) equilibrium C is thus a sequence of asset balances 
0( , , , , , )
B B
t t t t t t tM X B D B D
∞
= , of taxes and seigniorage transfers 0( , )t t tT S
∞
= , of 
asset prices 0( , )t t tR Q
∞
=  and of present-value operators 0(PV )t t
∞
=  such that 
equations (1), (2), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (A4) hold.16 Whenever these 
equations are satisfied, households find it optimal to hold money and excess 
reserves in amounts Mt and Xt respectively, as well as short-term bonds and 
consols in amounts Bt tB B−  and 
B
t tD D−  (the amount issued by Treasury, 
net of CB holdings). 
III. Properties of equilibria 
Having characterised the equilibrium conditions, we are now ready to study 
its properties. Our first step is to establish an economic equivalence 
proposition. This proposition formally states that, in our simple model, the 
timing of taxes and seigniorage transfers from the CB to Treasury is 
irrelevant; only their present values matter. Since taxes are non-distorting  
in our economy, Ricardian equivalence holds, as in Barro (1974).17 
Furthermore, the dividend policy followed by the CB in distributing its 
profits to Treasury is economically irrelevant: as an example, in a period in 
which the CB makes large profits, it does not matter whether it immediately 
distributes them to Treasury or whether instead it distributes them over time, 
purchasing short-term Treasury debt with the retained earnings in the 
meantime. 
Proposition 1 Let C1 be a competitive equilibrium. It is then possible to 
construct many other equilibria as follows: 
16Equation (A4) is the expression for the present-value function, which is given in the online appendix 
(http://www.ifs.org.uk/docs/fsdec13_bassetto&messer_appendix.pdf). 
17The proposition would be simpler to state if the economy featured complete markets; in this case, 
taxes and seigniorage payments could be varied in arbitrary ways across both time and states of nature as 
long as their present values are unaffected. Since we do not allow arbitrary contingent contracts across 
agents, the proposition considers only a specific class of tax and payment shifts, that can be financed with 
appropriate issuance of short-term debt. 
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1. By changing the timing of taxes: 
• given some arbitrary period t1 and some arbitrary state of nature 
realised in period t1, increase (decrease) taxes in period t1 by ΔT; 
• in each subsequent period s up to some other arbitrary period t2 > 
t1, increase (decrease) short-term borrowing by Treasury (Bs) by 
1
(1 )s vv tT R ;=∆ +∏  
• decrease (increase) taxes in period t2 by 
2
1
1(1 ).t vv tT R
−
=
∆ +∏  
2. By changing the timing of seigniorage remittances: 
• given some arbitrary period t1 and some arbitrary state of nature 
realised in period t1, increase (decrease) seigniorage transfers in 
period t1 1t(S )  by ΔS; 
• in each subsequent period s up to some other arbitrary period t2 > 
t1, decrease (increase) short-term borrowing by Treasury (Bs) by 
1
(1 )s vv tS R ;=∆ +∏  
• between periods t1 and t2, decrease (increase) CB holdings of short-
term debt Bs(B )  by 
1
(1 )s vv tS R ;=∆ +∏  alternatively, increase 
(decrease) excess reserves (Xs) by the same amount; 
• decrease (increase) seigniorage transfers in period t2 by 
2
1
1(1 ).t vv tS R
−
=
∆ +∏  
Proof. Equations (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (A4) are unaffected by these 
changes, since they are constructed in a way that alters only the timing, but 
not the present value, of taxes and seigniorage revenues. Similarly, it is 
straightforward to verify that the debt adjustments described in the 
proposition are exactly those that are needed to ensure that equations (1) and 
(2) continue to hold. The new sequences thus satisfy all the conditions for a 
competitive equilibrium. QED. 
The economic equivalence of Proposition 1 ignores the reality that 
Treasury and the CB may make decisions over time, rather than committing 
to their entire future strategy at time 0, and at times they may have 
conflicting objectives. Specifically, it is likely that Treasury will mostly be 
concerned with the fiscal implications of the seigniorage transfers, while an 
independent central bank is typically tasked with price and macroeconomic 
stability. The main rationale for segregating monetary policy in an 
independent actor is precisely to insulate it from the temptation to resort to 
the printing press to inflate debt away and to raise seigniorage revenues. 
When conflict is present, who controls the size and timing of seigniorage 
transfers may be important, and this in turn is likely to depend on the balance 
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sheet of the CB. To illustrate this point with an extreme example, suppose 
that at time 0 the CB disburses to Treasury more than the value of its initial 
net assets, plus the entire present value of future seigniorage profits: 
(10) 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
0
(1 ) PV ( ).B B s s
s
S B Q D X M M
∞
− − − −
=
> + + − + −∑  
Using equations (2) and (6), it is easy to verify that, at least in some states of 
the world, this dividend policy leads the CB to start period 1 with net 
liabilities that exceed the present value of its future seigniorage profits: 
(11) 0 0 1 0 1 1
1
(1 ) PV ( ).B B s s
s
X B Q D M M
∞
−
=
− − + > −∑  
This situation is only sustainable if Treasury recapitalises the CB by sending 
some reverse transfers in period 1 or in one of the later periods. But by 
having to rely on transfers from Treasury, the CB may see its independence 
reduced, and this may affect the balance of powers between the two 
government agencies if their objectives conflict in the future. It is thus quite 
possible that such a dividend policy would generate incentives to pursue a 
different monetary–fiscal policy from the one that would be selected if the 
central bank does not disburse immediately its entire present value of its 
future profits, and instead retains assets and profits, disbursing the proceeds 
over time; in particular, a temptation might emerge to resolve the imbalance 
by printing extra money and thereby raising seigniorage instead. 
We already observed from equation (6) that the present value of 
seigniorage transfers from the CB to Treasury arises from two distinct 
sources – the value of its asset portfolio and the monopoly profits on money 
issuance. In the discussion that follows, a special case will play a prominent 
role: 
Definition 1 We define money to be fiat whenever monetary policy is such 
that Ms ≥ Ms–1 in every period. 
We call money fiat in this case because money derives value uniquely from 
its liquidity services, and not from the CB assets: the CB never uses its assets 
to redeem any money that it issued in the past. The case of fiat money is 
particularly relevant because it describes well the behaviour of most 
contemporary CBs: they increase the money supply both to accommodate 
real growth and to allow some inflation. 
We now proceed as follows: 
• We fix an arbitrary desired path for prices (and thus inflation), Pt, as 
well as an initial nominal interest rate R0; in equilibrium, this determines 
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all future nominal interest rates, present values and money balances 
(from equations (7), (8) and (A4)).18 
• We then study the profits of the central bank and the evolution of its net 
worth under different policy scenarios that are consistent with the 
desired path. While Mt and Rt are set by the requirements of the desired 
path, the CB and Treasury still have freedom in setting different paths 
for short- and long-term debt, excess reserves, taxes and seigniorage 
transfers. Through a sequence of simple propositions, we illustrate how 
the timing and riskiness of the CB profits depend on its choices of asset 
holdings and reserves. 
In particular, we will be interested in two related, but distinct, questions: 
1. When will the CB be able to guarantee a positive stream of payments to 
Treasury all along the desired path?19 
2. When will the CB be able to always book positive profits all along the 
path? 
We will consider a sequence of asset-management strategies on the part 
of the CB, starting from the most conservative policy, where CB profits are 
guaranteed to be positive independent of the accounting criterion, to the least 
restrictive one, where the CB is potentially exposed to unbounded losses. We 
will do so first for the simpler case in which the desired path features 
nominal interest rates that are always strictly positive. We will then expand 
the discussion to situations in which the short-term rate may occasionally 
drop to zero, in which case the distinction between the powers that the CB 
has with and without the ability to pay interest on reserves is blurred. 
1. Rt >0 always 
Bills only 
We call the most conservative asset-management strategy bills only: it 
entails investing the entire portfolio of assets in short-term securities.20 
Proposition 2 Suppose that the CB is not allowed (or never chooses) to 
pay interest on reserves and that it invests all of its assets in short-term 
securities. Then its profits are always positive, whether they are measured at 
historical prices or marked to market. 
18Fiat money will characterise a subset of these possible desired paths. 
19Throughout the paper, ‘positive’ (‘negative’) means greater than or equal to (less than or equal to) 0. 
Whenever a quantity is strictly greater (smaller) than 0, we will call it ‘strictly positive’ (‘strictly 
negative’). 
20The ‘bills only’ doctrine was introduced in the United States in the aftermath of the Treasury accord 
of 1951, which freed the Federal Reserve from pegging interest rates on government debt. For a 
presentation of the arguments discussed at the time, see, for example, Young and Yager (1960). 
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Proof. With Rt > 0, excess reserves will always be 0 if the CB does not pay 
interest on them: the private sector will find it preferable to invest in 
government bonds any funds that are not needed for liquidity services. 
Furthermore, BtD  = 0 in any period t. From equations (3) and (4), we thus 
obtain 
(12) 1 1
1
0.
1
HC MM Bt
t t t
t
R B
R
−
−
−
Π = Π = ≥
+
 
QED. 
In general, the profits from equation (12) will always be strictly positive, 
because the CB holds some assets on its balance sheet. However, they could 
be zero if the CB chooses (or is forced) to immediately remit to Treasury a 
payment equal to its assets in every period. If CB independence is related to 
its profit stream, the ‘bills only’ policy coupled with no excess reserves gives 
the best-case scenario, since the CB is guaranteed to never record losses, 
either at historical prices or marking its assets to market. When money is 
fiat, this policy can also guarantee a positive stream of seigniorage transfers, 
as we establish below: 
Proposition 3 Suppose that the CB is not allowed (or never chooses) to 
pay interest on reserves and that it invests all of its assets in short-term 
securities. In addition, suppose that money is fiat. Then the CB can 
guarantee a positive stream of seigniorage transfers to Treasury. 
Proof. In the online appendix.21 
Intuitively, since its portfolio of assets is not needed to redeem money 
issues when money is fiat, the CB can simply pay to Treasury its profits 
from equation (12) plus the value of any new money that it issued during the 
period. 
Buy and hold 
In the strategy that we call buy and hold, the CB invests in both long- and 
short-term debt, but it holds all of its debt to maturity. 
Proposition 4 Suppose that the CB is not allowed (or never chooses) to 
pay interest on reserves. Suppose further that its assets are invested in both 
short- and long-term debt, but that the CB holds long-term debt to 
maturity.22 Then its profits at historical prices are always positive. 
21http://www.ifs.org.uk/docs/fsdec13_bassetto&messer_appendix.pdf. 
22In the case of consols, this means that the stock of consols held by the CB never declines in nominal 
terms; the CB uses only the coupon payments from the consols (along with maturing short-term debt) for 
reinvestment into new government bonds or for paying seigniorage transfers. 
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Proof. As before, no interest payment on reserves implies Xt = 0 in all 
periods. Furthermore, since the CB holds its debt to maturity, BtD  ≥ 1
B
tD −  in 
all periods. Equation (3) then implies 
(13) 1 1 1
1
0.
1
HC Bt
t t t
t
R B D
R
−
− −
−
Π = + ≥
+
 
QED. 
While the value of the CB portfolio can now fluctuate with movements in 
long-term rates, the CB is still investing in assets that command a positive 
interest rate and issuing money that pays no interest rate. Under the ‘buy and 
hold’ strategy, at historical cost the CB simply books as profits the interest 
on short-term debt and the coupon paid by long-term debt. 
We do not discuss here the profits and losses that the CB faces when its 
assets are marked to market, nor its ability to pay positive seigniorage 
transfers: this is because the implications of ‘buy and hold’ on these two 
subjects are the same as ‘unlevered active trading’, the strategy to which we 
turn next. 
Unlevered active trading 
Here, we do not make any assumption about the CB’s portfolio, other than 
imposing that it does not pay interest on reserves. 
Proposition 5 Suppose that the CB is not allowed (or never chooses) to 
pay interest on reserves. Then the CB losses, whether at historical prices or 
marked to market, cannot exceed the value of the CB portfolio in the 
previous period (evaluated at historical prices or marked to market, 
respectively). 
Proof. Once again, no interest on reserves implies Xt = 0. From equation 
(3), 
(14) 1
1
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1
( )( )
1
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B B
t t
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From equation (4), 
(15) 
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QED. 
When the CB invests in long-term securities, movements in long-term 
interest rates affect the value of its portfolio. Under ‘buy and hold’, these 
changes are reflected in the CB’s accounting only if it marks its assets to 
market, while active trading may lead the CB to realise its losses and thus 
book them even if it values its assets at historical cost. 
In either case, the CB can do no worse than losing all of its investments, 
which would happen in the extreme circumstance in which all of its assets 
are long term and the long-term interest rate becomes so large that Qt 
becomes close to zero.23 Not surprisingly, in the case of fiat money, when 
assets are not needed to redeem previously-issued money, such a loss would 
not threaten the CB’s ability to pay positive seigniorage transfers, as the 
following proposition formally states: 
Proposition 6 Suppose that the CB is not allowed (or never chooses) to 
pay interest on reserves and that money is fiat. Then the CB can guarantee a 
positive stream of seigniorage transfers to Treasury. 
Proof. In the online appendix.24 
Even though under fiat money the CB can arrange its payments to 
Treasury so as to never need a reverse transfer (a ‘bailout’), the potential loss 
of value of its portfolio will still translate into a smaller present value of 
seigniorage transfers to Treasury (equation (6)); this risk may be undesirable 
to the fiscal authorities. 
Quantitative easing 
In our final step, we consider the case in which the CB issues interest-
bearing reserves. To the extent that these reserves are invested in short-term 
government debt, this policy has no effect: the CB buys a debt instrument 
that promises to pay $1 in the subsequent period and finances the purchase 
by issuing a promise to deliver the same amount.25 But when the CB uses 
excess reserves to finance purchases of long-term debt, it is effectively 
taking a levered bet on long-term interest rates. Because of its leverage, the 
CB can no longer guarantee that the value of its portfolio will remain 
positive, independent of movements in long-term rates. If the CB position is 
sufficiently large, the losses from this bet will thus need to be covered with 
23To be precise, even in this extreme circumstance the CB would still have positive assets left, from the 
coupon payment 1.
B
tD −  
24http://www.ifs.org.uk/docs/fsdec13_bassetto&messer_appendix.pdf. 
25In practice, excess reserves held by banks at the CB are overnight loans, while government debt is of 
longer maturity. At the height of a financial crisis, this difference may be important. For the fiscal 
implications considered here, a CB policy of purchasing short-term debt (e.g. of a three-month maturity) 
by issuing overnight reserves will still carry very low interest-rate risk. 
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profits from the monopoly over the issuance of money or, in extreme 
circumstances in which not even those are sufficient, with transfers from 
Treasury. This intuition is formalised in the following proposition: 
Proposition 7 Suppose that the CB is allowed to pay interest on reserves 
and that the path of future long-term interest rates is uncertain. Then the CB 
is free to choose policies that entail the risk of arbitrarily large losses. Some 
of these trading strategies will require transfers from Treasury to the CB to 
keep inflation at the preset desired path. 
Proof. In the online appendix.26 
In our highly stylised model, where there is no cost of raising taxes, fiscal 
losses (whether incurred by the CB or by Treasury) carry no welfare 
consequences. This is no longer the case in environments where taxes are 
distortionary. Long-term debt will be particularly helpful if strains on the 
government budget are associated with higher long-term interest rates, a 
likely event in practice. Lustig, Sleet and Yeltekin (2008) study the case of 
distortionary taxes in detail and formally prove that the maturity structure 
that minimises expected distortions arising from taxes and inflation involves 
issuing only long-term debt. In this case, expected tax distortions increase if 
the CB engages in maturity transformation by replacing long-term debt 
issued by Treasury with short-term obligations of its own. 
The fact that the CB can take risks large enough to require a 
recapitalisation does not mean that it will do so. As an example, Carpenter et 
al. (2013) and Greenlaw et al. (2013) compute some projections of the 
balance sheet of the Federal Reserve; under adverse scenarios, they establish 
that these could lead to losses according to the accounting developed here,27 
but these losses would be very minor compared with the present value of 
seigniorage revenues going forward. 
In Proposition 7, as well as in all previous propositions, we kept the 
stochastic process for inflation, nominal interest rates and money fixed. 
Because of this assumption, the CB profits and losses only had fiscal 
implications, affecting the size (and, in extreme cases, the sign) of 
seigniorage transfers to Treasury, and from there would spill over to taxes. 
But inflation, (nominal) interest rates and the money supply are under CB 
control. This suggests that a CB facing losses always has an alternative – 
resorting to the printing press. To better understand this alternative, suppose 
that a CB starts period t in a situation such that, at the desired path of 
26http://www.ifs.org.uk/docs/fsdec13_bassetto&messer_appendix.pdf. 
27What is called ‘losses’ in this paper is called a ‘deferred asset’ in Carpenter et al. (2013) and 
Greenlaw et al. (2013). This is consistent with a view that seigniorage payments are not profits distributed 
to Treasury, but rather a tax paid by the Federal Reserve. According to this interpretation, current losses 
could be used to reduce future seigniorage payments, and thus future tax liabilities, thereby resulting in a 
‘deferred asset’. 
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inflation, nominal interest rates and money balances, the left-hand side of 
equation (6) is negative, which would require (sooner or later) a transfer 
from Treasury. The CB liabilities are made of two items, both of which can 
be discharged with no need of transfers from Treasury, provided the CB is 
willing to let money grow sufficiently fast and suffer the inflationary 
consequences: 
• Promises to decrease the money supply (when Ms < Ms–1) can be avoided 
simply by never repurchasing previously-issued money, but rather by 
choosing an increasing path for the money supply. 
• Excess reserves Xt are simply a promise to deliver money, so they can be 
discharged by increasing the money supply by Xt in period t (in equation 
(6), this will generate a corresponding increase in the profits from the 
monopoly issuance of money). 
2. The zero lower bound 
Propositions 2–6 rely on the fact that excess reserves are necessarily zero 
unless the CB pays interest on them. However, whenever the nominal 
interest rate Rt is at zero, this is no longer the case: the distinction between 
paying and not paying interest on excess reserves is lost. This has effectively 
been the case in the last few years. 
The following proposition shows that excess reserves cannot cause losses 
on the CB balance sheet, whenever they are invested according to the ‘bills 
only’ doctrine. This result is intuitive: any excess reserves are matched by 
assets of the same maturity, and hence no loss can arise from their issuance. 
The only qualification that is required for the case in which Rt may hit zero is 
that the CB should never distribute transfers to Treasury in such an amount 
that it would lead its portfolio of assets to have negative value.28 
Proposition 8 Suppose that the CB invests all of its assets in short-term 
securities and that its dividend policy is such that Bt – Xt ≥ 0 always. Then its 
profits are always positive, whether they are measured at historical prices or 
marked to market. When money is fiat and the CB starts from an initial 
portfolio of positive value, this policy can be achieved while paying positive 
transfers in every period, St ≥ 0. 
Proof. After imposing 0,BtD =  equations (3) and (4) imply 
(16) 1 1 1
1
( ),
1
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t t t t
t
R B X
R
−
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−
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+
 
28In the case of Rt > 0, this was guaranteed, since we necessarily had Xt = 0. 
 
© 2013 The Authors 
Fiscal Studies © 2013 Institute for Fiscal Studies 
 
432 Fiscal Studies  
 
 
 
which is positive whenever 1 1
B
t tB X− −−  is positive. If the CB starts from an 
initial condition B–1 – X–1 ≥ 0 and the money supply is an increasing  
sequence (money is fiat), equation (2) implies that the CB can set St =
1 1 1 0
B
t t t tM M B X− − −− + − ≥  and still retain a portfolio of zero value  
( )Bt tB X=  from period 0 onwards. QED. 
While the ‘bills only’ doctrine ensures the CB against losses on its 
balance sheet, it also makes monetary policy particularly ineffective when 
short-term nominal interest rates are zero, since it is unlikely that swapping 
Treasury short-term liabilities for CB short-term liabilities would have any 
effect. 
When the CB buys long-term debt, it is straightforward to verify that 
Propositions 4–6 continue to be true if the CB limits its creations of excess 
reserves to the amount of short-term bills in its portfolio. Further quantitative 
easing beyond this value involves taking leveraged interest-rate risk, and 
may cause losses that would need to be repaid with profits from money 
issuance and/or transfers from Treasury, even if the risk is originally taken at 
a time in which short-term rates are zero. 
IV. A look at interest-rate risk under current policy in the United 
States 
The main goal of our paper has been to illustrate the ways in which specific 
rules of conduct imposed on the central bank may limit its ability to take 
fiscal risk. In this section, we illustrate the importance of such limits by 
showing how the assets and liabilities currently held by the Federal Reserve 
System alter the consolidated government’s exposure to interest-rate risk. 
While other authors have analysed the Fed’s portfolio and interest-rate 
scenarios in more detail,29 we are not aware of studies that have linked the 
Fed’s interest-rate risk exposure to that of Treasury to obtain a global picture 
of how monetary policy is affecting the fiscal authorities’ exposure to 
interest-rate risk. 
We will compute an approximate measure of the duration of the portfolio 
of marketable securities issued by Treasury before taking into account the 
offsetting effect of the System Open-Market Account (SOMA) held by the 
Federal Reserve System, and see how it changes after this is incorporated. 
We use the Monthly Statement of Public Debt30 to compute a schedule of 
payments due from Treasury on marketable debt held by the public.31 We 
29See Carpenter et al. (2013), Greenlaw et al. (2013) and Hall and Reis (2013). 
30We rely on the August 2013 issue, available at http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/mspd/ 
2013/2013_aug.htm. 
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compute the present value of this debt relying on the yield curve produced 
according to the method of Gürkaynak, Sack and Wright (2007), which 
yields $11.7 trillion.32 Based on these data, we obtain a duration of 
approximately 4.5 years for the Treasury liabilities; this implies that an 
increase of 10 basis points of interest rates across the entire yield curve 
would reduce the present value of Treasury’s marketable securities held by 
the public by approximately $52 billion.33 
Next, we compute the effects of the Fed’s assets and liabilities. We obtain 
the Fed’s SOMA portfolio from the data published by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York.34 For Treasury and agency debt, we aggregate payments 
at the yearly level as done in the computation of the Treasury’s marketable 
debt, and we use the same term structure.35 Computing the present value and 
duration of mortgage-backed securities is significantly more complicated, 
due to the prepayment risk.36 Furthermore, duration is not as reliable a 
measure of interest-rate risk of these securities, because the prepayment 
option makes their value an extremely non-linear function of interest rates. 
We thus value these securities at par, and we choose an extremely 
conservative duration of 2 years; any larger number would magnify the 
effect of the Fed’s SOMA portfolio on the duration of the Fed/Treasury 
consolidated portfolio. With these inputs, the Fed’s SOMA holdings37 have a 
present value of $3.5 trillion38 and a duration of 5.4 years. On the liability 
side,39 the two large items are currency in circulation and reserve balances. 
Assuming that the Fed will continue to pursue a policy of fiat money (as 
31For simplicity, we aggregate these payments by year, assuming that all remaining payments due in 
2013 are due immediately, all 2014 payments are due in exactly 1 year, and so on. We also abstract from 
Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), where a distinction would need to be made between 
increases in inflation and real rates; these securities are a small fraction of the total and have little effect 
on our conclusions. Finally, we assume that all Treasury bills are due immediately. This slightly biases 
downwards our measure of duration, which is a conservative choice for our exercise: a higher duration 
would (slightly) increase the effect of the Fed SOMA portfolio on the overall duration of government 
debt. 
32We use data as of 4 September 2013, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/ 
200628/200628abs.html. 
33This drop in value is a measure of the interest savings that Treasury would reap by not having to roll 
over debt at the new, higher rates. 
34We use holdings as of 4 September 2013, available at http://newyorkfed.org/markets/soma/ 
sysopen_accholdings.html. 
35Using the term structure of Treasury securities for agency debt neglects the interest-rate spread 
between the two; this is not of major concern since the spread is currently small and the amount of agency 
debt held by the Fed is also a small fraction of its overall portfolio. 
36For a discussion, see Mattey (2000). 
37Once again, we exclude TIPS from the computation. 
38This number is higher than the par value reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which 
does not take into account unrealised capital gains. 
39We obtain liabilities from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.4.1, available from the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/; we use data 
from the release of 5 September 2013. 
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defined in Section III), currency in circulation does not have to be 
repurchased. We thus only count $2.3 trillion of reserves held by banks; 
these are overnight loans to the banking sector and thus have zero duration. 
Since the Fed holds long-term assets partly financed by short-term liabilities, 
taking into account this leverage increases the interest-rate risk measured by 
duration: the duration of the combined portfolio is about 15.7 years. An 
increase of 10 basis points in interest rates reduces the value of assets held 
by the Fed, net of liabilities, by about $19 billion. 
The Fed’s current exposure is thus not large compared with the present 
value of its current and future income from net interest payments year after 
year: in 2012 alone, net income was over $90 billion.40 At the same time, the 
Fed’s exposure is significant compared with Treasury’s: in the event of a 10-
basis-point increase in interest rates, the Fed’s losses would offset more than 
a third of the Treasury’s gains.41 In terms of duration, accounting for the 
Fed’s position reduces the duration of government debt from 4.5 to 3.2 
years: a larger fraction of debt needs to be rolled over frequently, with a 
corresponding additional burden should interest rates increase. 
It is worth noting that it would be incorrect to simply assume that the 
duration of government debt would be 1.3 years longer without the policy of 
quantitative easing pursued by the Federal Reserve System. This is because 
Treasury might have reacted to this policy by deliberately issuing longer-
term debt.42 Nonetheless, these numbers show that quantitative easing has a 
measurable impact on the interest-rate risk exposure faced by taxpayers. 
Moreover, if quantitative easing is undone by the actions of fiscal 
authorities, it becomes even more important to study the political 
mechanisms by which the distribution of gains and losses across two agents 
that ultimately share the same budget constraint has an effect on the 
economy. 
V. Conclusion 
We have analysed simple conditions under which central bank policy 
ensures positive profits and/or positive transfers to Treasury. We did so by 
use of a highly stylised model, where the results are particularly transparent 
and easy to derive. Nonetheless, the implications apply equally well to much 
richer environments featuring nominal frictions, an explicit banking sector, 
and transaction or regulatory costs that may segment markets for 
government debt of different maturities. In these environments, more 
40A 10-basis-point interest-rate movement is small, and larger interest-rate movements would certainly 
lead to losses under marked-to-market accounting in some years, but it remains the case that these one-
time losses are of the same order of magnitude as the net interest payments of a single year. 
41Being based on duration, this computation is a reliable approximation for small changes in interest 
rates. 
42See, for example, Sparshott (2013). 
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interesting roles for monetary policy and quantitative easing emerge, which 
are not present in our simple set-up;43 a trade-off would then emerge 
between the pursuit of these roles and the minimisation of fiscal risks. 
To the extent that financial market imperfections warrant a role for 
adjusting the maturity structure of the liabilities of the central bank and 
Treasury, an expansion of the balance sheet of the central bank financed with 
excess reserves held by commercial banks is only one of many potential 
arrangements. As an example, on 17 September 2008, with the Fed funds 
target rate still at 2 per cent and while the Federal Reserve did not yet have 
power to pay interest on reserves (and thus to raise funds from commercial 
banks at that rate), the US Department of the Treasury announced a 
Supplementary Financing Program,44 whereby Treasury bills would be sold 
and the cash proceeds would be deposited at the Federal Reserve, which 
could in turn use the cash to buy privately-issued and mortgage-backed 
securities, without increasing the overall level of the monetary base. The 
Treasury deposits with the Federal Reserve did not earn interest; this 
represented an alternative funding mechanism for quantitative easing that 
shifted interest-rate risk from monetary to fiscal authorities. Similarly, to the 
extent that a policy of lowering long-term interest rates by shifting the 
maturity structure of government debt held by the public is desirable, this 
goal could be attained either by the policy of quantitative easing pursued by 
the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, or by the Treasury’s choice of 
concentrating its debt issues at the short end of the maturity structure. While 
the two options have similar implications for the portfolio of securities 
available to the private sector, they allocate fiscal risk differently between 
the central bank and the government. A goal of this paper is to stimulate 
further analysis on how the allocation of this risk is likely to affect 
macroeconomic outcomes, and ultimately on the optimal allocation of this 
risk. 
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